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Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism

Predictions of offending and classifications of offenders are
inexorably connected. Sometimes the predictions are used
to sort people into risk categories that can influence decisions about sentencing, parole release, institutional custody
level, or intensity of supervision. Other times they are used
in assigning people to appropriate treatment programs or
in trying to allocate scarce correctional programs costeffectively, as, for example, by focusing resources on
higher-risk offenders. Simple and, in the abstract, widely
supported normative and ethical injunctions are largely
incompatible with contemporary uses of predictions to sort
people into risk categories for sentencing, parole, and
similar decisions, but present fewer obstacles to classification for program assignments.
These injunctions include the following:
1.

Don’t treat people differently on the basis of race or
ethnicity.

2.

Don’t treat people differently on the basis of gender.

3. Don’t treat people differently on the basis of age
except to mitigate treatment of the young.
4.

Don’t treat people differently on the basis of social
class.

5. Don’t treat people differently on the basis of lawabiding decisions about how to live their lives.
Injunctions about age, gender, and inherently personal
choices (such as whether to marry) are sometimes violated
explicitly, for example, when Virginia’s sentencing guidelines use them as bases for determining who will be sentenced to imprisonment. The others are violated indirectly
when factors are used such as education and employment,
which are correlated with race and social class.
Development and use of prediction methods are in their
heyday in our time, but there is nothing inherently distinctive about them. Indeterminate sentencing was predicated in large part on the idea that sentencing and parole
release decisions should be based on assessments of
offenders’ prospects of living law-abiding lives and on
efforts to enhance those prospects by means of correctional
treatment programs.1 Development of base expectancy
tables for parole prediction was a major focus, most
famously associated with Ernest W. Burgess2 of the
Chicago School of Criminology from the 1920s through the
1950s.3 European and American positivists from the 1890s
through the early 1930s assumed that behavior is largely
determined and that the aim of the criminal system should

be to treat when it can and incapacitate when it cannot.4
Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian punishment system proposed
that penalties be individualized to offenders’ ‘‘sensibilities,’’
by which he meant their personal characteristics, on the
basis of judges’ assessments.5 Plato and Aristotle two millennia ago discussed the desirability of reforming many
wrongdoers, implicitly assuming some ability to predict
who needed what kinds of handling.6
Two things concerning prediction are distinctive to our
time. The first is a preoccupation with prediction of recidivism rather than other plausible outcomes such as successful completion of treatment programs, improvement in
qualities or capacities, or development of employable skills.
Recidivism prediction is ubiquitous. Everybody’s doing it.
There is an enormous academic and professional literature.
Unprecedented private sector involvement has occurred in
designing and marketing instruments and providing services to government.
The second is a collective amnesia about what was
learned about the use of prediction in the 1970s when
widespread support for indeterminate sentencing collapsed. Basing decisions about individuals’ liberty and
autonomy on calculations of risk raises fundamental normative and ethical issues that were once taken seriously but
are no longer often acknowledged or discussed.
Before the 1970s, the desirability of individualization,
and with it the need to make ad hoc assessments of rehabilitative and incapacitative considerations in individual
cases, was taken for granted.7 When the determinate sentencing era began, and support for retributive ideas about
punishment ballooned, people devoted extensive thought to
when, under what circumstances, and subject to what
constraints rehabilitative and incapacitative considerations
should be taken into account when dealing with individual
offenders. The premise was that pursuit of justice, of
imposition of punishments proportioned to the offender’s
culpability or the gravity of the offense, should be the
primary considerations in sentencing. The challenge was to
find ways to reconcile pursuit of utilitarian aims within that
framework. Considerations of risk and treatment remained
generally accepted in relation to administrative judgments
about the intensity of supervision or eligibility for programs
but were widely believed to be highly suspect concerning
decisions about the nature or duration of sentences.
Norval Morris’s The Future of Imprisonment,8 among the
most influential books of its time on sentencing and corrections, offered a comprehensive analysis. He, among
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many others at the time, believed that parole release should
be abolished. Respect for offenders’ personal autonomy
and the goal of equal treatment of comparably culpable
offenders, he wrote, forbade sending people to prison for
the purpose of rehabilitative treatment, and forbade compelling them to participate in treatment programs while
there, though they could be required to participate for
a short time in order to learn about programs they should
be free later to reject. Risk predictions, he wrote, should not
ordinarily influence decisions about sentence lengths. This
was partly because of considerations of justice and partly
because of the problem of false positives. Predictions of
future violent offending then (as now) were much more
often wrong than right. Within any class of people predicted
to commit violent or sexual crimes in the future, many
fewer would do so (‘‘true positives’’) than would not (‘‘false
positives’’). As a result most people confined for longer
periods for preventive reasons would not have committed
serious new crimes, and thus would be deprived unjustly of
their liberty. In later work, Morris developed criteria for
identifying cases in which incapacitative sentences might
be justifiable, but the criteria were narrow and could seldom be satisfied in practice.9
Morris argued that for any offender, the nature of the
current offense (and to some degree of his or her prior
record), should set a range from within which punishments
might justifiably be imposed.10 This approach, which he
and others called ‘‘limiting retributivism,’’ remains highly
influential and serves as the implicit rationale of many state
sentencing guidelines systems.11 It is the explicit normative
framework of the current edition of the Model Penal Code’s
provisions on sentencing.12 To the extent that Morris considered utilitarian considerations to be appropriate in setting a sentence, they were relevant to choosing
punishments from within the prescribed range. Any punishment, however, that exceeded the upper bound of that
range would be to that extent unjust. He argued that sentences should normally be imposed at or near the bottom of
the allowable range with special evidence-based justifications required for harsher sentences predicated on rehabilitative or incapacitative considerations. Richard Frase’s
more recent asymmetric version of limiting retributivism,
in which upper bounds of deserved punishment are near

absolute but lower bounds are highly flexible, offers much
the same prescription.13
Many corrections officials and researchers in the 1970s
were influenced by the same shifts in attitudes and beliefs
toward retributivism that affected policy makers and scholars. Parole guidelines were the first major policy initiative
of the sentencing reform movement, though one foot
remained firmly placed in the individualization logic of
indeterminate sentencing.14 Their proponents, like supporters of statutory determinate sentencing, sentencing
guidelines, and parole abolition, sought to make decisions
about punishment fairer, more consistent, more predictable, and more transparent.15 Evening out disparities in
sentences imposed by judges was an important aim.
However, the core idea was that parole boards should take
account of prisoners’ prospects for law-abidingness. To do
that, prediction instruments were developed.
The most famous was the Salient Factor Score developed
for use in federal parole guidelines. Based on research by
Vince O’Leary, Don M. Gottfredson, Leslie Wilkins, and
others, the federal guidelines incorporated empirically based
factors that could be used to classify prisoners in relation to
predictions of future offending. The factors used, however,
reflected concerns for fairness prevalent at the time. Gender
and race were ruled out because they are ascribed traits for
which offenders bore no responsibility. Age at first commitment was initially a factor but was later abandoned. The
initial guidelines incorporated status variables such as
employment, education, residential status, and family characteristics, but these were abandoned because they are
heavily correlated with race. Blacks were on average less well
educated than whites, had weaker employment records, had
less stable residential circumstances, and had weaker family
roles and statuses. Use of such factors would systematically
treat blacks more severely than whites, and that, the U.S.
Parole Commission decided, would be unjust.16 In a similar
vein, scholars argued that it is unjust and undesirable in
a society that celebrates Enlightenment values of freedom
and personal autonomy to penalize citizens for making
quintessentially personal choices about such things as marriage, education, work, and living arrangements.17
The succession of changes to the Salient Factor Score is
shown in Table 1. Age at first commitment and three socio-

Table 1. Changes Over Time in Salient Factor Score Elements in U.S. Parole Guidelines

Convictions
Incarcerations
Age at first commitment
Age at current commitment
Recent commitment free period
Not auto theft
Not check fraud
No parole revoke, offense on parole
Custody status
No drug dependence
Education
Employment
Family
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1973 version

1976 version

1991 version

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
NO
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
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economic factors appear in the initial system, but all gradually disappear. So also do auto theft and check fraud factors,
which were removed because their use would delay release
dates for large number of prisoners who commit highfrequency, low-seriousness offenses. Prediction systems
would have comparatively low rates of false positives if minor
property and drug crimes were counted, but doing so would
fill prisons with minor offenders for whom incapacitation by
imprisonment is neither cost-effective nor just. If imprisonment is to be used largely for serious offenses and offenders, recidivism predictions should target only violent and
sexual crimes (and genuinely serious property crimes, but
prisons hold comparatively few such offenders).
A number of ethical and normative propositions emerge
from the sentencing and parole initiatives of the 1970s and
writing about them:
1.

2.

The primary criteria taken into account in decisions
about the nature, duration, and severity of punishments should be based on considerations of justice;
the offender’s culpability and the gravity of the
offense should be the primary determinants.
Sentences should ordinarily be imposed at the bottom of the applicable range, unless persuasive, validated, evidence-based reasons are given for
imposing something harsher.

3. Sentences above the upper bound of the applicable
range are prima facie unjust.
4.

Ascribed characteristics for which individuals bear
no responsibility, such as race, ethnicity, gender,
and age, should not be included among parole and
sentencing criteria (except, for different multiple
reasons, for consideration of youth and advanced
age as mitigating factors).

5. Personal characteristics such as education, employment, residential stability, and family circumstances
should not ordinarily be included among aggravating sentencing and parole criteria because their use
systematically disadvantages black and other
minority offenders (though they may be used as
mitigating factors).
6.

A wide range of personal characteristics including
sometimes even race, gender, and age may in particular circumstances be included among eligibility
criteria for treatment and related programs.

Most of these adjurations have fallen into desuetude
since the 1970s including, despite occasional claims to the
contrary, the retributive idea that punishments should to
a meaningful degree be proportionate to the offender’s
culpability or the gravity of the offense. All of them, however, retain their normative force and are likely someday to
re-emerge as widely recognized requirements of justice. In
this article I discuss their applicability to current practices.
In doing so, I draw on distinctions in Monahan and
Skeems’ paper on prediction: Between use of predictions
for risk classification in sentencing and for program
assignments and among fixed risk markers (e.g., race,

gender), variable risk markers (e.g., age, criminal history),
and variable risk factors (e.g., employment) that might be
used as factors in prediction instruments.18 Section I
briefly, for no more is required, discusses the exiguous
legal limitations on predictions of recidivism. Section II
discusses normative constraints on uses of prediction that
are implicit in mainstream theories of punishment. Sections III, IV, and V examine arguments that can be made
for use and prohibition of consideration in recidivism prediction of fixed and variable markers and variable factors.19
Section VI recapitulates previous points about differing
ethical implications and constraints of use of predictions in
sentencing and other liberty-restricting settings and in
program assignments. Section VII ponders the question,
why are ethical and normative considerations no longer
much considered or honored in criminal justice system
uses of recidivism prediction?
I. Legal Constraints

Very little need be said about legal constraints on the use of
predictions, for there are almost none. The U.S. Supreme
Court over the past four decades reinterpreted a longstanding disproportionality doctrine implied by the U.S.
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment in such a way that it imposes few
practical constraints on the severity of substantive sentencing policies adopted by a legislature or an administrative agency exercising delegated authority. Noteworthy
decisions upheld twenty-five-year and life sentences for
minor property crimes under hoary habitual offender statutes20 and California’s three-strikes law.21 Likewise, the
court held that predictions of dangerousness can constitutionally justify indeterminate continued civil confinement
of ‘‘sexual predators’’ after the expiration of sentences
imposed as punishments for particular crimes.22 The
imposition of particular, including lengthy, sentences on
the basis of predictions of recidivism is seldom likely to be
held to violate constitutional proportionality standards.
Requirements of constitutional due process and equal
protection are likewise seldom likely to impede the use of
particular factors in prediction instruments. The traditional
analysis requires strict scrutiny of inherently suspect factors such as race or religion; a ‘‘substantial state interest’’
must be shown. Gender differences in treatment must
withstand ‘‘intermediate scrutiny.’’ For other factors, only
a ‘‘rational basis’’ need be shown.
That jurisprudence is largely toothless so far as criminal
justice system decision making is concerned. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that police and immigration
agents may include race and ethnicity among factors used
in profiling23 and that stark racial disparities in outcomes of
officials’ decisions do not rise to the level of constitutional
violations unless there is convincing evidence of an invidious intention to discriminate on the basis of race in the
particular case.24 It also held that judges and juries in death
penalty cases may consider clinical evidence on predictions
of future dangerousness.25
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Race, ethnicity, and religion are not to my knowledge
anywhere used as an explicit factor in prediction instruments or in sentencing or parole policies. However, the use
of any of them likely would be upheld, as it was in the
profiling cases, so long as it was only one among several
factors. Explicit use of race, ethnicity, or religion, however,
is widely regarded as unseemly, and so the issue is unlikely
to arise.
The explicit use of gender has arisen under the Virginia
sentencing guidelines. There, male gender is used as a factor that reduces an offender’s likelihood of being diverted
from an otherwise applicable prison sentence. To my
knowledge female gender is nowhere used as an aggravating factor. Being female in Virginia is a mitigating factor
relative to the treatment of men. While writing this article
I found no reported cases on Virginia’s use of maleness as
an aggravating factor. This is not surprising. Virginia’s
guidelines lack presumptive legal authority, and judges are
not obliged to follow them.
Use of any other factors need satisfy only a ‘‘rational
basis’’ test. Since courts on separation of powers reasoning
bend over backwards not to be seen as second-guessing
legislatures and administrative agencies operating within
the scope of their authority, constitutional objections to use
of other factors are exceedingly unlikely to succeed.
The old saw that what is legal is not necessarily moral,
however, applies. Law and morality often march in different
directions. The American constitutional jurisprudence
concerning classification of people into groups for treatment within the criminal justice system has atrophied, but
that cannot justify treating people differently on the basis of
morally or ethically suspect categories.
II. Normative Constraints

In this section, I provide a potted summary of major ideas
in punishment theory to make this point: much current
policy and practice concerning risk predictions is flatly
inconsistent with mainstream normative theories of punishment. People involved in setting and implementing
corrections and sentencing policies are working in the
same morality-free zone in which the enactors of threestrikes, LWOPs, sexual predator, career criminal, and
lengthy mandatory minimum sentence laws labored.
Almost all such laws are incompatible with conventional
retributive and consequentialist ideas about proportionate
punishments.
Every mainstream punishment philosophy incorporates
two fundamental ideas that emerge from the belief that all
human beings, including offenders, should be treated with
concern and respect. The first is that just punishments
should be scaled to some measure of the seriousness of
crimes: crimes of comparable severity should be punished
comparably; crimes of different severity should be punished differently. This requirement is sometimes described
in terms of horizontal (like cases alike) and vertical
(different cases differently) equity. All retributivist theories
concur in the view that punishments, if they are to be just,
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must be proportionate because they express and are justified by assessments of the offender’s relative moral
blameworthiness.
Utilitarian theories get to the same place by different
reasoning. Threatened punishments should aim to minimize harm and should therefore provide incentives to
commit lesser rather than greater crimes by proportioning
punishments to their seriousness. Attempts should be
punished less than completed crimes to encourage desistance; if the punishments are different, Bentham reasoned
and Common Law doctrine provided,26 malefactors having
second thoughts have incentive to stop. If you’re going to be
punished equally severely whether you continue or not, you
may as well continue. Likewise, lesser crimes should be
punished less than greater ones to discourage commission
of the greater. If robbery and armed robbery are punished
equally severely, there is no reason not to use a weapon.
The second fundamental idea is that there are limits on
the state’s moral authority to punish. For retributivists there
are two versions of the claim. For ‘‘positive’’ retributivists
like Kant or Hegel, or in our time Michael Moore or
Andrew von Hirsch, crimes should be punished precisely
as much as is deserved, and neither more nor less.27 For
‘‘negative’’ retributivists, such as Norval Morris and
Richard Frase,28 offenders may be punished as much as
they maximally deserve, but need not be. For both sets of
retributivist theories, however, imposition of punishments
greater than are deserved relative to the seriousness of the
crime is unjust.
Restorative justice theories typically take the same
position though on different reasoning. John Braithwaite,
the most influential restorative justice theorist, offers
a negative retributivist account. Proportionality per se, he
argues, is not important. The important objectives are to
treat offenders and victims with respect and concern and to
try to repair broken or damaged relations among the victim,
the offender, and the community. If restorative processes
culminate in unanimous agreements among participants
for substantially different consequences for offenders in
comparable cases, so be it. BUT, he writes, there is a human
rights limit: the upper bound of proportionate sentences
the justice system might impose.29
For utilitarians, respect for the humanity of the offender
requires imposition of the least severe punishment that will
achieve the aims sought.30 To inflict punishments for
crimes is to cause pain to offenders. Infliction of pain is
a bad thing, ‘‘wicked,’’ Bentham said, and should only be
done for a good reason. If imposition of X units of pain will
send the wanted deterrent message, imposition of 2X units
is excessive and unjust. It is nothing more, or more
defensible, than gratuitous infliction of pain. Bentham
referred to this as the principle of frugality.
Norval Morris’s theory of limiting retributivism synthesized these ideas.31 From Kant and Bentham both, he
derived the notion that the nature of the crime sets the
upper limit of punishments that may justly be imposed.
From Bentham he derived the notion that the least severe
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applicable punishment should be imposed unless there are
good reasons to impose something more severe.
Much that is done in the name of risk prediction is
incompatible with all of these ideas. The moral myopia that
characterized legislatures when they enacted three-strikes,
LWOPs, sexual predator, career criminal, and mandatory
minimum sentence laws afflicts the risk prediction industry. Each of these kinds of law often results in imposition of
sentences that violate proportionality norms and fail to
accord respect and concern to offenders.
A number of states are busy at work trying to include
risk predictions in sentencing guidelines. Monahan and
Skeem provide several examples and discuss ongoing
work in Pennsylvania in detail.32 There are several problems. First is the excessive punishment problem: given
the extreme lengths of legally authorized and routinely
imposed prison sentences in the United States, it is
highly unlikely that sentence increases for offenders
adjudged to be high risk will be consonant with proportionality constraints. Second is the reliability problem
associated with false positives: many offenders sentenced
to extended terms of imprisonment would not have
reoffended. Third is the suspect factors problem (discussed below): most prediction instruments now in use
include socio-economic factors correlated with race and
ethnicity, and include factors that in effect punish lawful
life-style choices that in a free society people are entitled
to make. Examples include decisions to marry, have
a family, take further education, have a regular job, and
live in stable residential circumstances. These are different from life-style choices related to crime or criminal
milieu such as selling or abusing unlawful substances or
joining criminal enterprises.
These prediction problems are less acute in contexts
other than sentencing. In jurisdictions that have chosen to
maintain individualized sentencing by means of parole
release, for example, risk classifications based on ethically
permissible factors may be germane to release decisions.
Risk predictions based on permissible factors may often be
allowable in determining institutional security and custody
levels. Risk predictions, even including such otherwise
forbidden factors as race, ethnicity, religion, and gender,
may be germane to program eligibility decisions. A fundamental difference between program assignment and sentencing decisions is that participation in programming
often is meant to be and sometimes is beneficial to participants. The key issues at stake are not greater or lesser
severity of punishment but humane and cost-effective
allocation of scarce resources. Stark examples include culturally ‘‘appropriate’’ programs for members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. Garden variety examples include
educational, vocational, anger management, cognitive
skills, and parenting programs meant to target identified
deficits. It would make little sense not to take educational
credentials and existing work experience and skills into
account in assignment to educational or vocational
programs.

III. Ethical Constraints—Fixed Markers

It ought to be platitudinous and anachronistic to write that
there is something fundamentally unethical or immoral
about apportioning punishments or other intrusions on
liberty on the basis of ascribed characteristics for which no
coherent argument can be made that offenders bear personal responsibility for them. Gender, race, ethnicity, and
age raise this issue albeit in different ways.
Gender in contemporary America cuts in different
directions for men and women in different contexts.
Assiduous efforts are made in many contexts to prevent or
minimize differential treatment of women on the basis of
gender. This is so even when there are strong actuarial or
policy grounds for doing so. Women live longer than men,
for example. Insurance companies long charged lower rates
to women than men for life insurance of a particular
amount. For the same reason, pension programs long
charged women higher premiums or provided lower benefit levels. Insurance companies and pension administrators claimed those differences made actuarial sense, but on
policy grounds those policies have come under (increasingly successful) attack for many years. A similar trend is
underway to make automobile insurance gender-blind even
though the effect is to increase premiums for safer-driving
women. In the criminal justice system, the early sentencing
commissions found that women received systematically
less severe punishments than men. On gender equality
grounds, every sentencing commission decided neither to
promulgate less severe sentencing guidelines for women
nor to make gender a mitigating factor.33 The deliberate
decision was made to establish gender-blind guidelines that
if consistently applied by judges would operate to increase
sentences for women.
Gender blindness is a powerful idea. Treating people
differently because they are women seems wrong. So,
I suspect most people believe, is treating people differently
because of their sexual identities or preferences. That idea,
however, has not stopped policy makers and developers of
prediction instruments from incorporating maleness as an
aggravating factor that, in the notorious Virginia guidelines, increases the probability of receiving a prison
sentence.
Defenders of the Virginia guidelines might argue that
the guidelines themselves are gender neutral but that
a policy on mitigation provides criteria to guide judges in
deciding whether to disregard the guidelines and divert
lower-risk offenders from imprisonment. Seen in that way,
the policy does not disadvantage male offenders but
advantages female ones.
Such an argument might or might not be disingenuous
but it is at minimum incomplete. First, guideline systems
operate in their entirety. Policies on diversion are as much
part of the system as policies on whether prison is or is not
indicated as an appropriate sanction. Second, the structure
of Virginia’s diversion policy specifies not who should, but
who should not be diverted, and for that choice male gender
is a reason for not diverting. That is analytically
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indistinguishable from using male gender as a criterion for
committing offenders to prison in the first place.
Race and ethnicity raise different issues. Both race and
Hispanicity are routinely used, with constitutional approval
by courts, as factors in racial profiling by law enforcement
officials. In the criminal justice system, no jurisdiction
known to me explicitly incorporates race and ethnicity in
sentencing or parole release criteria. Many do so, however,
indirectly through the use of socio-economic factors correlated with race and ethnicity.34 Thirty years ago, it seemed
obvious to the U.S. Parole Commission that punishing
black offenders more severely indirectly through the use of
socio-economic variables is wrong, and they were removed
from the original Salient Factor Score even though their
removal weakened risk predictions. For similar reasons
none of the early sentencing commissions included socioeconomic variables in their sentencing guidelines systems.
Section 994(d) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
explicitly directs the federal sentencing commission: ‘‘The
Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy
statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national
origin, creed, and socio-economic status of offenders.’’
Section 994(e) continues: ‘‘The Commission shall assure
that the guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of
considering the education, vocational skills, employment
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties
of the defendant.’’ The use of such variables correlated with
race and class is now commonplace in prediction instruments and parole and sentencing guidelines.
Finally, age. Individuals have no control over how old
they are. To that extent, age is an ascribed status like
gender, race, and ethnicity. For eighty years after the
founding of the American juvenile court, through the
1980s, youth was generally viewed in the United States as
a mitigating factor on multiple logics. In almost all other
developed countries it still is.35 Young people are inexperienced, emotionally immature, cognitively immature, and
more susceptible than they will be in later life to peer
influences. Developmentally, young people are more
comfortable engaging in risky behavior than are older
people. For varying combinations of all these reasons and
others, criminal activity is common in the teenage years.
Most people, however, soon mature and desist offending.
That is why age-crime curves have for decades shown that
the peak ages of property offending are in the middle teenage years and of violent offending are in the late teen-age
years.36 That is also why most active offenders desist at
early ages.37
Nonetheless, youth is now used, I don’t know how
commonly, as a factor in prediction systems. The most
notorious example, now in use for more than two decades,
is in Virginia’s sentencing guidelines where youth is by far
the most heavily weighted factor in determining which
minor offenders should not be diverted from imprisonment. This is wrong in principle but also, in light of
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a growing body of research showing that imprisonment is
criminogenic, perverse.38
Defenders of Virginia’s guidelines might argue that
youth is used not as a criterion for decisions to imprison
offenders but for decisions to divert from imprisonment.
That, like similar arguments concerning use of maleness as
an aggravating factor in sentencing, is a distinction without
a difference for two reasons. First, diversion standards are
a component in the overall system of guidelines calculation,
and the calculation is not complete until all steps have been
completed. Second, the logic of Virginia’s guidelines is not
that older people deserve less punishment or for substantive policy reasons should be diverted, but that younger
people should be held for incapacitative reasons. The primary aim is to not to decarcerate older people but to
incarcerate the young solely because they are young.
All in all, contemporary recidivism prediction instruments raise many troubling questions in relation to their
handling of ascribed factors. Ethical problems that in earlier
times seemed simple appear not to trouble contemporary
policy makers.
IV. Ethical Constraints—Variable Markers

‘‘Variable markers’’ are fixed characteristics that can
change. Possible examples include age, religion, nationality, sexual identity or preference, and criminal history.
Age, because it cannot be altered by the individual or
anyone else, is better regarded as a fixed marker like other
ascribed statuses. Regarded, however, as a variable marker,
extending concern and respect to young offenders should
call for treating youth (and old age) as factors that might
mitigate punishment but otherwise as a neutral factor that
cannot aggravate it.
Religion and sexual identity or preference are slightly
different. Unlike age, they can change as a result of personal choices. So far as I know they are nowhere used as
factors in recidivism prediction instruments. It is hard to
imagine that many policy makers would be more comfortable explicitly using these characteristics than explicitly
using race. Here too, as with race, ethnicity, and age, they
might sometimes appropriately be used as factors in making program assignments.
Nationality co-varies in complex ways with ethnicity,
religion, and culture, each of which in principle should be
suspect. Persuasive arguments can be made that nationality
should be treated in the same way as religion and sexual
identity or preference. In practice it is effectively, and
sometimes explicitly (in border control profiling of people
suspected of being Mexicans), used as a risk predictor.
Criminal history raises more complex issues than is
usually recognized.39 Although it appears self-evident to
Americans that people who have previously been convicted
of crimes should be punished more severely for a new
offense, all else being equal, it is not self-evident to people
in other countries. In the Scandinavian countries, for
example, the general assumption is that punishments
should not be increased because of prior convictions. The
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reasoning is that the offender has already been punished as
much as he or she deserved for the former offense and
should now be punished as much as is deserved for the new
one.40 Prior convictions are often taken into account as
aggravating factors in other Common Law countries, but
usually subject to sharp limits.41
America policy makers and practitioners are unlikely
soon to adopt or endorse the Scandinavian point of view
and decide to take account of prior records not at all or only
a little. Criminal history does, however, have dramatic
aggravating effects in American sentencing. Under threestrikes, habitual offender, and career criminal laws, prior
convictions make a huge difference in the sentences
offenders receive. Under most sentencing guidelines systems, third or fourth convictions can result in sentences
two-to-four times longer than are received by first offenders.42 Any searching inquiry into ethical issues in American sentencing would have to explore the rationales and
justifications of those differences.
Even if that fundamental question is set aside, difficult
ethical issues remain. One concerns race and ethnicity. Use
of criminal history factors in sentencing, like use of socioeconomic status factors, works to the systematic disadvantage of members of disadvantaged minority groups. Commonly used factors in prediction instruments include age at
first arrest, custody status at the time of the offense, and
total convictions or arrests. All of these adversely affect
more minority than white defendants, and all raise troubling issues. Black men are arrested at younger ages and
more often than white men for reasons that have as much
to do with racially differentiated exercises of police discretion as with racial differences in offending behavior. Racial
profiling by the police targets blacks and Hispanics and
exposes them proportionately more often than whites to
arrest. Police drug enforcement policies target substances
that black drug dealers sell and places where they sell them,
resulting in rates of arrests for drug offenses that have been
four to six times higher for blacks than for whites since the
mid-1980s.43
Blacks more often commit and are more often arrested
for violent crimes than whites. In a system where criminal
history makes a big difference in sentencing, even that
facially plausible explanation for differences in conviction
rates means that criminal history factors disproportionately
affect blacks. Richard Frase,44 in the most comprehensive
study ever completed of racial disparities in a state sentencing system, found that two-thirds of racial disparities in
imprisonment rates in Minnesota result from the weighting of criminal history factors in sentencing.
Criminal history raises other ethical issues whose resolution may depend on the use to which predictions are put.
When the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code
were being developed in the 1950s, vigorous debate broke
out over criminal history. The argument was over what kind
of criminal history counts. Paul Tappan,45 chair of the U.S.
Parole Board, argued that with liberty at stake, only prior
convictions should count. Arrests or prosecutions not

resulting in a conviction should not. This may seem surprising to contemporary minds. We, after all, live in a time
when the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s guidelines
require as a part of ‘‘real offense sentencing’’ that all ‘‘relevant’’ conduct including behaviors not resulting in an
arrest or resulting in a conviction be taken into account if
the judge by a civil law standard of proof believes they
occurred. On these issues, the United States is an outlier,
even among common law countries. Elsewhere, only prior
convictions count as criminal history.
Like some other possible prediction factors already discussed, the ethical cases to be made concerning criminal
history may differ depending on the use to which predictions are put. Use of any criminal history factors at sentencing other than prior convictions raises prima facie
ethical due process and equal protection problems. People’s
liberty should not be incrementally taken away except under
fair procedures and standards of proof. Use even of prior
convictions as aggravating factors raises troubling problems of disparate treatment and racial disadvantage that
warrant greater reflection and more careful analysis than is
common.
Analyses may be different concerning use of criminal
history factors in parole release considerations and in programming assignments. I’ve explained why in discussing
other factors.
V. Ethical Constraints—Variable Factors

Biographical and socio-economic status factors raise other
problems in relation to use of risk predictions in sentencing. Two major ones have been discussed above. The first is
that use of marital status, employment, education, family
status, and residential stability as factors in prediction
instruments systematically disadvantages minority defendants. The social and economic disadvantages that disproportionately afflict blacks and Hispanics in America are
partly the products of historic and ongoing discrimination
and bias. It should be at least discomforting that the use of
socio-economic status factors in prediction instruments
exacerbates those disadvantages.
The second is that many socio-economic status characteristics reflect lifestyle choices, such as the decisions to
marry, go to school, or have a steady job, which in a free
society are not the state’s business. It is at least illiberal to
attach incremental penal consequences to those choices.
Committing offenses, selling drugs, and actively participating in criminal gangs also reflect personal choices,
but they are choices of a different kind. Those behaviors are
unlawful; people who engage in them assume risks of
arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment. In
a sense, they choose to live dangerous lives.
People who make lawful lifestyle choices are not comparable, and do not necessarily choose to live dangerous
lives. Free citizens are entitled to decide to be married or
not and to have children or not, even if statistical analyses
show that being unmarried is correlated with higher rates
of offending and reoffending. Free citizens are likewise
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entitled to decide to seek university degrees, join apprenticeship programs, or live lawfully hand-to-mouth as many
artists, musicians, and writers do by some combination of
choice and necessity. Citizens are entitled to choose not to
work at all and to live on income from trust funds or
indulgent parents.
Prediction instruments and sentencing policies that
incorporate socio-economic status and other lifestyle factors
generally do so because research shows them to be correlated with offending. Many offenders, however, do not—in
a fundamental sense—choose to be poorly housed, poorly
employed or unemployed, and poorly educated. Some do.
Even if poor peoples’ choices are more constrained than
those of more privileged people, they are lawful choices all
the same. Punishing people more severely because of their
lawful choices raises the same ethical issues for a disadvantaged inner-city minority man as for a privileged trust
fund beneficiary.
Such problems deserve more attention than they
receive. Positive retributivists such as Kant or von Hirsch
might ordinarily be expected to oppose the use of predictions of reoffending in sentencing and to limit allowable
criteria to those that in some way relate to the offender’s
blameworthiness or the gravity of the crime. Negative
retributivists such as Morris or Frase might be expected to
allow uses of prediction in setting sentences from within
bounded ranges, but in doing so need to work through and
adequately resolve problems raised by correlations between
predictive variables and race or ethnicity, and by the prospect of punishing lawful lifestyle choices.
Discriminating use of at least some of those factors in
instruments developed for use in programming assignments may raise somewhat different issues than in
sentencing.
VI. Predictions in Sentencing and in Program
Assignments

Repeatedly above I have suggested that ethical arguments
may take different forms in relation to sentencing, parole
release, and program assignments. I don’t repeat those
points here, but offer one more ethical argument that was
common in the 1970s and 1980s. Norval Morris46 famously
argued that prisoners’ moral autonomy should be respected
by not compelling them to participate in treatment programs
against their will. Section 994(k) of the federal Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 explicitly directed the U.S. Sentencing
Commission that guidelines should not provide for imprisonment for the purpose of treatment or rehabilitation: ‘‘The
Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the
inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of
imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment.’’ Enabling legislation for several of the early state
sentencing commissions contained similar language.
That argument was made and that legislation was
enacted at times when ‘‘nothing works’’ ideas were current
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and before research on drug treatment showed that the best
predictor of success was time in treatment and it didn’t
matter whether participation was voluntary or coerced. One
might argue that the drug treatment findings and more
recent evidence that many kind of programs can reduce
recidivism if they are well targeted, designed, and implemented justify coerced treatment.
I don’t think the new findings alter the arguments at all.
Mill’s classic argument against paternalism remains powerful, and most people, particularly most privileged people,
still believe in it. The prevailing right-wing paranoia about
state intrusion in private lives is one piece of evidence. Even
if the state arguably has more ethical latitude in developing
prediction instruments for use in program assignments
than in sentencing, that need not imply that the state is
entitled to compel program participation for an offender’s
own good.
VII. Conclusion

In recent decades and increasingly in the past ten years,
criminal justice policy makers and practitioners have
become preoccupied with recidivism. People who want to
reduce the use of imprisonment feel obliged to offer alternatives that are said to reduce recidivism.47 Proponents of
reentry programs feel obliged to propose release into programs, and forms of supervision, that are said to reduce
recidivism.48 Sentencing commissions increasingly aim to
incorporate predictions of recidivism into guidelines as
Virginia long ignobly has done.49
All of these initiatives essentialize risks of recidivism.
Programs are not seen as good because they enhance
offenders’ life chances, address deficits, or provide tools
that may enable offenders to live more satisfying or productive lives, but because they reduce risks of reoffending.
This puts the cart before the horse. The origins of indeterminate sentencing lay not in thinking about recidivism but
in the perception than offending often resulted largely from
the circumstances of peoples’ lives, including lack of education or work skills and mental health problems. According to Enoch Wines and Zebulon Brockway,50 the
nineteenth century’s leading American prison and parole
reformers, the aim was to individualize treatment in order
to help offenders improve their lives and prospects. If that
happened, they would be less likely to reoffend.
Contemporary thinking about recidivism prediction has
turned that around. The emphasis is not on the offender
and his or her future well-being but on his or her future
law-abidingness. That is why recent probation initiatives
such as Project Hope, which couple breach of drug-use and
similar conditions with near-automatic imposition of short
prison sentences, are pernicious.51 They are concerned only
with the offender’s compliance with conditions and do little
except offer legal threats of what will happen if conditions
are violated, rather than attempt to address the circumstances in the offender’s life that brought him or her into
court. The offender is disappearing from view. What’s in
focus is his risk of recidivism.
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The inevitable next question is, why is the offender
disappearing from view in the United States? There are
three likeliest explanations. The first is that neoliberal
trends of recent decades have produced a popular culture
that accepts reduced governmental support for social welfare initiatives, is more competitive, and is less sympathetic
to the disadvantaged and disheartened.52 The second is that
the conservative political ascendency of the past 40 years
brought with it a fundamentalist moralism and judgmentalism that leave little room for empathy and for according
concern and respect to troubled people, including criminals.53 The third is that it’s about politics and race. Conservative Republican candidates sought to attract white and
Southern voters away from Democrats by emphasizing the
‘‘wedge’’ issues of crime and welfare fraud, both associated
in media imagery, the mass media, and public stereotypes
with black people.54 The conservative law-and-order movement targeted violent crimes for which blacks are more
often convicted than whites.55 The War on Drugs launched
by Presidents Reagan and Bush I targeted street sales of
cocaine and crack in minority neighborhoods even though
all the available evidence suggests that no larger percentages of blacks than whites sell drugs.56 Most likely all three
explanations are important parts of the story.
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